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THE MEANING OF “MEDICARE-FOR-ALL”
By Isaac D. Buck†

ABSTRACT
Medicare-for-All proposals are heralded for the guarantee of
additional coverage they provide, moving health insurance in the
United States from nearly universal to completely universal. Indeed,
if Medicare is known for something, it is the guarantee of access to
health insurance it provides. Since its inception, the Medicare
program has provided universal coverage to Americans aged 65 and
older—a population that is both expensive to cover and often most in
need of high-quality health care. But Medicare is more than that.
While Medicare has become the program that guarantees coverage to
an entire subset of American citizens, it has also served as a platform
for innovative policy designs intended to address the health care cost
crisis. From Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), to the MeritBased Incentive Payment System (MIPS) within its Part B, to its
formidable fraud and abuse tools like the False Claims Act, Medicare
has been important not only because of the example it has provided
in achieving insurance universality, but also because it has provided
a space for law, policy, and medicine to innovate. Specifically, it has
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served an important role in making American health care delivery
more standardized, efficient, and equitable. An expansion of the
program could extend its efficiencies on a universal or near-universal
basis, with positive impacts for millions of American patients. This
piece makes the argument that the real upside of the implementation
of such “Medicare-for-All” proposals, however unlikely politically,
may not be the coverage gains they promise, particularly because the
Affordable Care Act’s exchanges have secured such extensive growth
in coverage for millions of Americans. Instead, the value of
“Medicare-for-All” proposals may be their ability to universally
extend Medicare’s cost-containment policies, many of which are
unknown to the general public or at least not fully understood. It is
this impact—the expansion of Medicare’s regulatory regime to cover
millions more Americans—that may be the most important
consequence of the push for “Medicare-for-All.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
Policy debates around “Medicare-for-All” proposals impact
domestic political discourse in 2020. Although new on specifics, these
debates constitute a new iteration of the same discussion that has
continued for more than 50 years, focusing on the appropriate roles
of private industry and government action within the public sphere.
Different from the debates that occurred a generation or two ago,
these discussions are infused with the lessons and realities of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), the most
important piece of health care legislation since the mid-1960s.
Perhaps it is surprising that these debates have become so
prevalent, given that the ACA’s passage was a mere ten years ago. A
number of characteristics of the debate—from the stylizing of the
proposals as “Medicare,” to the regulatory impact such new
proposals would have on the delivery of American health care, to
their temporal proximity to the massive coverage-securing ACA—are
noteworthy. But beyond the political branding involved and
regardless of implementation, the popularity and focus of the plans
do tell policymakers something: ten years ago, the ACA expanded
health insurance, and now America is clamoring for better health
insurance.
While the national narrative has focused on insurance access
through “Medicare-for-All,” this piece argues that it is the regulatory
impact of Medicare expansion that would have a more profound
effect on American health insurance. This article takes the position
that it is not the impact of universal insurance that is dispositive, but
rather, the expansion of the modern regulatory state, applying to
millions of additional Americans, that may have the largest impact
on Americans’ health insurance and access to care.
This piece makes this argument in three sections. It first analyzes
the regulatory impact of “Medicare-for-All” proposals.1 Second, it
presents the regulatory impact that expanding Medicare to a much
larger swath of the American populace—and universally in the case
of a mandatory program—would have on the standardization,

1

The chief focus of this article is on “Medicare-for-All” proposals that would seek to cover
all Americans in a single, universal, mandatory pool.
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efficiency, oversight, and leverage of relationships. From expanding
powerful health care fraud and abuse statutes, to extending its
standard-setting and innovation-incentivizing character, to reducing
administrative costs and hospital charges, Medicare’s expansion
could inject efficiencies into a system largely dominated by private
insurance companies currently lacking them. Third, this piece
summarizes the challenges and unknowns that may result from the
proposals. While expanding Medicare to provide insurance for a
larger swath of the American population would seem to bring
positive spillover regulatory effects, its overall impacts remain
unknown.

II. “MEDICARE-FOR-ALL” IS A POLITICAL SIGNAL
The popularity of Medicare—America’s seminal public health
insurance program—is not in doubt.2 Instead, today, the relevant
polling is for “Medicare-for-All,” an amorphous set of policy
prescriptions and delivery reforms that have been highlighted on the
2020 presidential campaign trail over the last year.3 The fact that
such proposals are growing in political popularity is as much a part
of the story as the content and policy prescriptions within the
proposals themselves.
The political popularity of traditional Medicare must be
responsible. Seniors, of whom most are Medicare beneficiaries,

2

See Dan Mangan, Medicare, Medicaid Popularity High: Kaiser, CNBC (July 17, 2015, 3:00 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/16/medicare-medicaid-popularity-high-ahead-ofbirthday.html (noting that 77 percent of respondents “considered Medicare to be a very
important government program”). See also Sarah Kliff, When Medicare Launched, Nobody Had
Any Clue Whether It Would Work, WASH. POST (May 17, 2013), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/05/17/when-medicare-launched-nobodyhad-any-clue-whether-it-would-work/ (“Medicare is, these days, an incredibly popular
program. Americans overwhelmingly oppose cutting it. No politician would consider
repealing it. Most think providing health insurance to all Americans over 65 is worth the
(sic) both the trouble and the cost.”).

3

See John Tozzi & Danielle Parnass, Your “Medicare for All” Questions, Answered, BLOOMBERG
(July 31, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-29/how-medicarefor-all-could-mean-change-for-everyone-quicktake (“What would Medicare for All Mean?
That depends on who’s talking.”).
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consistently rate the coverage and quality of their health insurance
positively.4 Three-fourths of all Americans have called Medicare
“very important,” with majorities stating that it “should remain as it
is.”5 Given the contentiousness that existed at its inception, it is a
marvel that Medicare has become such a stable and popular
program.6 It occupies a position of cultural primacy, and has even
become meme-worthy.7
Primarily during the presidential primary of 2020, candidates
used the political popularity of the Medicare program to introduce
new single-payer or public option health care proposals. A number
of national figures and candidates for president, from progressive
politicians like Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Elizabeth Warren
(D-MA), to more centrist former candidates like Kamala Harris (DCA) and Cory Booker (D-NJ), to newcomers like South Bend, Ind.,
Mayor Pete Buttigieg adopted the language of Medicare in an effort
to sell new health care proposals throughout 2019. As a political
matter, these are savvy decisions.8
But these moves beg important substantive questions—the most
important of which focus on how closely related these new proposals
are to the Medicare program as Americans know it. In other words,

4

See Justin McCarthy, Most Americans Still Rate Their Healthcare Quite Positively, GALLUP
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/245195/americans-rate-healthcare-quitepositively.aspx.

5

Ken Walsh, The Politics of Medicare and Medicaid, 50 Years Later, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(July 30, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/30/thepolitics-of-medicare-and-medicaid-50-years-later.

6

See Kliff, supra note 2 (quoting news headlines that state “Selling Elderly on Medicare Is
Not Easy,” “A.M.A. Criticizes Medicare in Ad; Says It Would Be “Beginning of Socialized
Medicine,” and “Medicare Staffers Having Hard Time Enrolling Those Who Need It The
Most”).

7

See Bob Cesca, Keep Your Goddamn Government Hands Off My Medicare!, HUFFPOST,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/get-your-goddamn-governme_b_252326 (last visited
Dec. 6, 2017).

8

See Akilah Johnson, Medicare-For-All Is Not Medicare, and Not Really for All. So What Does It
Actually Mean?, PRO PUBLICA (Sept. 6, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org
/article/medicare-for-all-is-not-medicare-and-not-really-for-all-so-what-does-it-actuallymean (“how politicians talk about the issue matters, with 63% responding favorably to the
terms ‘Medicare-for-all’ and ‘universal health coverage.’ Those positive feelings begin
dissipating when it’s called a ‘single-payer national health insurance system,’ dropping to
49%.”).
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is Medicare the right platform for these proposals, or is it merely a
political branding decision? And, if, in the wake of the near-decadelong implementation and multiple near-death experiences of the
ACA,9 these proposals are addressing a compelling societal problem,
what, specifically, is that problem? If the ACA experience is a
prologue to an effort to instantiate a federal health care program that
guarantees universal coverage, those proposing “Medicare-for-All”
should be ready for a long fight.
At base, one inquires as to whether these proposals constitute
either political signaling that featured a catchy slogan in the middle
of a campaign, or serious substantive policy proposals that provide
clear prescriptions for America’s health care troubles with popular
policy solutions.10 Certainly, the first challenge is determining the
structure and content of each of the proposals. As part of this effort,
the persistent policy incoherence11 around various “Medicare-forAll” proposals is summarized below.

A. Policy-Based Incoherence
For the policy wonk, there are two particularly interesting
characteristics of the focus on “Medicare-for-All” as a cure to what
ails American health care financing. The first relates to the timing of
the proposals. The second is substantive, and seeks to find out what
these proposals contain and how they are likely to achieve their
goals. Both questions begin by asking what problem the proposals
seek to solve.
First, the timing of the “Medicare-for-All” cacophony is
noteworthy. Americans are ten years removed from the passage of

9

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); King v. Burwell, 574 U.S. 988
(2015). See also Chris Riotta, GOP Aims to Kill Obamacare Yet Again After Failing 70 Times,
NEWSWEEK (July 29, 2017, 6:53 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/gop-health-care-billrepeal-and-replace-70-failed-attempts-643832; Emmarie Huetteman, McCain Hated
Obamacare. He Also Saved It, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2018, 12:21 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/health/obamacare/mccain-hated-obamacare-he-also-saved-it-n904106.

10

See Melanie Mason, Beyond the Slogan, “Medicare for All” Vexes Democratic Presidential
Candidates, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-napol-medicare-for-all-presidential-20190210-story.html.

11

See Johnson, supra note 8.
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the ACA, which itself took generations to pass and implement,12 and
is still being challenged in court.13 The ACA’s survival—long under
threat—is still not free from doubt.14
Nonetheless, the party of Barack Obama has now decided to
push for fully universal health care coverage—policy designs that the
party’s most popular figure avoided in favor of his carefullyconstructed technocratic marvel in the ACA.15 It is all the more
complicated to consider that the party has turned toward “Medicarefor-All,” stylizing new proposals on the nation’s quintessential
insurance-granting health care insurance program to the nation’s
elderly, when the major positive accomplishment of the ACA was
securing coverage expansions.16
Indeed, the push for “Medicare-for-All,” as opposed to bolstering
the ACA, seems to be an interesting branding decision. Medicare,
known for its insurance universality for America’s senior citizens, is
clearly a smart political platform on which to base yet another fight
over health care reform, but may not be the right analog for the
policy construction, particularly because the ACA did so much to
secure coverage gains.17 In other words, fighting to secure additional

12

See Jonathan Oberlander, Long Time Coming: Why Health Reform Finally Passed, 29 HEALTH
AFFS. 1112 (2010), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0447.

13

See Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied en banc, 949 F.3d 182
(5th Cir., 2020) cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S.Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020); Land
of Lincoln Mut. Health Ins. v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2744 (2019) (granting writ of
certiorari).

14

See Texas, 945 F.3d 355.

15

See Matthew Sheffield, It’s Still Obama’s Party: Former President Easily Tops List of Who Best
Represents Democrats, THE HILL (Apr. 2, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americasthinking/436953-its-still-obamas-party-former-president-tops-list-of-who-best.

16

Reed Abelson et al., What Happens if Obamacare Is Struck Down?, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/health/obamacare-trump-health.html (noting that
21 million people “could lose health insurance” if the Trump administration’s effort to get
the law declared unconstitutional was successful).

17

See Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/
(noting that the number of uninsured Americans dropped from 46.5 million Americans to
below 27 million Americans between 2010 and 2016). But see Dan Witters, U.S. Uninsured
Rate Rises to Four-Year High, GALLUP (Jan. 23, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/246134
/uninsured-rate-rises-four-year-high.aspx (noting that uninsurance rate dropped from 18
percent to about 11 percent between 2013 and 2016, but has risen to 13.7 percent at the end
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access gains seems to be a noteworthy political choice, given the fact
that the number of uninsured has dropped in the last ten years under
the ACA.18 At the very least, one may inquire as to whether the
underlying popular desires that are driving these new proposals are
best addressed by building on a program that provides universal
access to health coverage, or, instead, should focus on shoring up
other, more feeble components of the ACA.
Secondly, substantively, the generalized term “Medicare-for-All”
seems to have an incoherence problem.19 In the summer of 2019, the
Democratic candidates for president—at the time more than two
dozen—had fractured their support along the spectrum of different
definitions and understandings of “Medicare-for-All.”20
The
candidates split into three general camps: (1) some candidates were
in favor of a more classic version of “Medicare-for-All,” (2) others did
not support “Medicare-for-All” but instead were supportive of
insurance expansions, and (3) a middle group was in favor of at least
“Medicare for some.”21 Even as the candidates split into these three
general groups, important differences among the politicians in each
camp remained.22
Specifically, some candidates in the 2020 presidential election
argued for “Medicare-for-All” in the most literal sense, emphasizing

of 2018).
18

See Rachel Garfield et al., The Uninsured and the ACA: A Primer – Key Facts about Health
Insurance and the Uninsured Amidst Changes to the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/the-uninsured-and-the-aca-a-primerkey-facts-about-health-insurance-and-the-uninsured-amidst-changes-to-the-affordable-careact-how-many-people-are-uninsured/ (“Before the ACA, the number of uninsured
Americans grew over time, particularly during economic downturns. By 2013, the year
before the major coverage provisions of the ACA went into effect, more than 44 million
people lacked coverage.” And by 2017, that number was about 27 million).

19

See Johnson, supra note 8 (noting that Medicare has “worked, more or less, because of the
government’s ability to set payments to health care providers.” “When you say Medicarefor-all, there are eight different flavors…. It’s an advertising slogan; it’s not a scientific
concept.”).

20

Alice Miranda Ollstein, Medicare for All, POLITICO (Sept. 29, 2019), https://
www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-views-on-the-issues/health-care/medicarefor-all/.

21

Id.

22

Id.
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access to insurance and excluding choice.23
This was most
prominently represented by Senator Bernie Sanders, whose plan
would have barred other options and mandate that all Americans
belong to one plan.24 This plan was called “significantly more
generous” than other countries’ government-run plans, as it includes
dental, vision care and prescription drugs.25 In Senator Sanders’
plan, consumers had no out-of-pocket spending—so no copayments
and no deductibles—and the plan was paid for by tax revenue.26
Other candidates submitted plans styled as “Medicare ‘for all
who want it,’” emphasizing choice.27 Mayor Pete Buttigieg was the
most well-known for this type of plan, which would have enrolled
uninsured individuals, grown subsidies under the ACA, and given
those with employer-based insurance the option of buying into the
plan.28 Buttigieg would also have added additional consumer
protections such as protecting against surprise billing and additional
charge caps for care.29
Some candidates were positioned between choice and access.
Senator Kamala Harris’ plan,30 which had also been styled as
“Medicare Advantage for All,”31 maintained private insurance and
allowed for a ten-year transition period before all Americans were
23

See also Danielle Kurtzleben, Kamala Harris Releases ‘Medicare for All’ Plan With a Role for
Private Insurers, NPR (July 29, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/29
/746051105/kamala-harris-releases-medicare-for-all-plan-with-a-role-for-private-insurers
(noting that Senator Harris’ plan differed from Senator Sanders’ plan, “under which any
insurance that duplicates the coverage provided by his Medicare-for-All system would be
banned.”).

24

See Sarah Kliff, Bernie Sanders’s Medicare-for-All Plan, Explained, VOX (Apr. 10, 2019, 11:00
AM), https://www.vox.com /2019/4/10/18304448/bernie-sanders-medicare-for-all.

25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Dylan Scott, Pete Buttigieg’s Medicare-for-All-Who-Want-It Plan, Explained, VOX (Sept. 19,
2019, 8:55 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/19/20872881/pete-buttigieg-2020-medi
care-for-all.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

See Kurtzleben, supra note 23.

31

See Matt Bruenig, The Real Costs of the U.S. Health-Care Mess, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/best-democratic-healthplan/595657/.
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enrolled into her “Medicare for All” program.32 Instead of
eliminating private health insurance, Senator Harris required private
insurance to “adhere to ‘strict’ requirements on costs and benefits.”33
Still, others seemed to reject the stylized “Medicare for All”
debate, like former Vice President Joe Biden’s plan, which was called
the “Affordable Care Act 2.0”34 and “radically incremental.”35 His
plan includes the adoption of a public option that would be
accessible to tens of millions of Americans.36 He would also bolster
the ACA’s tax subsidies, “uncapping” them for those who make
higher incomes.37

B. The Rhetoric of Medicare
The fact that multiple candidates seized on the terminology, and,
specifically, the “Medicare” name itself, is striking. It demonstrates
Medicare’s value as a powerful political force, and has, once again,
shown the importance of political terminology and branding.38 Even

32

33

See Tucker Higgins, Kamala Harris Unveils “Medicare for All” Plan That Won’t Kill Private
Insurance, CNBC (July 29, 2019 2:20 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/29/kamalaharriss-medicare-for-all-plan-keeps-private-insurance.html (“The plan does not go as far or
as fast as the one proposed by Sen. Bernie Sanders, which Harris has co-sponsored in the
Senate.”).
Id.

34

Dan Diamond, Biden Unveils Health Care Plan: Affordable Care Act 2.0, POLITICO (July15,
2019, 1:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/15/joe-biden-health-care-plan1415850 (noting, in a campaign ad, Joe Biden saying, “I understand the appeal of Medicare
for All…But folks supporting it should be clear that it means getting rid of Obamacare.
And I’m not for that.”).

35

See Julie Rovner, Biden’s “Incremental” Health Plan Still Would Be a Heavy Lift, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://khn.org/news/bidens-incremental-health-plan-stillwould-be-a-heavy-lift/.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

See Public Opinion on Single-Payer, National Health Plans, and Expanding Access to Medicare
Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.kff.org/slideshow/publicopinion-on-single-payer-national-health-plans-and-expanding-access-to-medicarecoverage/ (in a survey, 63 percent had a positive reaction to “universal health coverage”
and “Medicare-for-all,” while only 49 percent had a positive reaction to “single-payer health
insurance system”, and 46 percent had a positive reaction to “socialized medicine”).
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candidates’ plans that had very little to do with the Medicare
program seized on its public relations value.39
Presidential candidates used the rhetoric of Medicare—and
specifically, the language of access guarantees—to tout health care
proposals.40
Senator Elizabeth Warren called Bernie Sanders’
“Medicare-for-All” plan “the best way to give every single person in
this country a guarantee of high-quality health care.”41 Warren also
said that “[p]eople will have access to all of their doctors, all of their
nurses, their community hospitals, [and] their rural hospitals.”42
Indeed, the rhetoric of these proposals matches Americans’ responses
to polling questions that “universal coverage” is the top priority of a
national health plan.43 Further, as polling on an “‘optional’ Medicarefor-All” is “slightly more favorable across parties than a governmentadministered public option,” this may go a long way to explain the
terminology used by various political candidates.44
Even candidates and former candidates who were not proposing
single-payer-based health care plans followed suit, drawing on the
language of access. Senator Kamala Harris’s plan, which had been
referred to as “KamalaCare,” argued for expanding Medicare “to all
Americans and give everyone access to comprehensive health care.”45
But, according to reporting, the “proposal skimp[ed] on myriad

39

See Scott, supra note 27.

40

See Johnson, supra note 8 (quoting John McDonough, Harvard Public Health Professor, as
arguing “[i]t’s an advertising slogan; it’s not a scientific concept.”).

41

Dylan Scott, How Elizabeth Warren Has Stayed Out of the “Medicare-for-All” Fray, VOX (Sept.
16, 2019 4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/16/20869090/
elizabeth-warren-2020-medicare-for-all-voxcare.

42

William Saletan, “Medicare for All” Is Not a Winning Platform, SLATE (Sept. 13, 2019. 10:02
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/09/medicare-for-all-not-winning-platform
-biden-warren.html.

43

See Public Opinion on Single-Payer, National Health Plans, and Expanding Access to Medicare
Coverage, supra note 38 (noting that 89 percent of those asked said that “universal coverage”
was very important and nine percent that it was “somewhat important” to a national health
plan, much higher than the 38 percent who said the elimination of private health insurance
companies would be “very important”, and 29 percent would be “somewhat important”).

44
45

Id.
Dan Diamond & Christopher Cadelago, Kamala Harris’ New Health Plan: “Medicare for All” –
With Private Insurers, POLITICO (July 29, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2019/07/29/kamala-harris-medicare-for-all-1438631.
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details, including the plan’s cost.”46 Candidate Julian Castro, the
former U.S. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, also
supported “Medicare-for-all,”47 and said “[t]here is no reason, as
many folks have pointed out, that in the richest nation on earth,
anybody should go without health care.”48
Mayor Pete Buttigieg, who called his plan “Medicare for All Who
Want It,” described his proposal as guaranteeing that “every
American has access to affordable coverage either through private
insurance or a public alternative,” and for those who could not get an
affordable private option, citizens could “get a plan that is.”49 His
proposal provided for a public plan that could compete with private
plans and “naturally lead to Medicare-for-all.”50 Further, the plan
capped marketplace premiums for a larger group of individuals who
purchased plans on the individual exchange.51 In addition to
bolstering the ACA, the architecture of this plan mostly contemplated
constructing a “public option,”52 which is a policy prescription that
was suggested by Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton
in 2016.53 Mayor Buttigieg’s use of the term “Medicare” was
46

Id.

47

Rose Minutaglio, Julian Castro Is Running for President in 2020. Here’s Where He Stands on 9
Important Issues., ELLE (June 25, 2019), https://www.elle.com/culture/movies-tv/
a27073125/julian-castro-presidential-election-2020-issues/.

48

Emily Birnbaum, Julian Castro: ‘We Should Do Medicare for All in this Country’, HILL (Jan. 8,
2019, 9:24 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/424289-julian-castro-we-should
-do-medicare-for-all-in-this-country.

49

See Pete Buttigieg, Here’s a Better Way to Do Medicare-For-All, WASH. POST: OPINIONS (Sept.
19, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/19/petebuttigieg-heres-better-way-do-medicare-for-all/.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

See Dan Diamond, How Pete Buttigieg Would Expand Health Coverage, POLITICO (Sept. 19,
2019, 5:49 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/19/pete-buttigieg-2020-healthcare-plan-1502581 (“The plan formalizes proposals the South Bend, Ind., mayor has touted
in the campaign, like building on Obamacare and creating a new ‘public option’ to compete
with private insurers.”).

53

See Alan Rappeport & Margot Sanger-Katz, Hillary Clinton Takes a Step to the Left on Health
Care, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/us/politics
/hillary-clinton-health-care-public-option.html (Hillary Clinton is quoted as saying, “I’m
also in favor of what’s called the public option, so that people can buy into Medicare at a
certain age.”).
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noteworthy, as the universal program for seniors may have little to
do with his plan that injected a proposed public option and bolstered
the ACA’s structures. In other words, Buttigieg’s “Medicare for All
Who Want It” may have had very little Medicare—in all its
mandatory, automatic, and universal glory—in it.
In the late spring of 2019, among those Americans who noted
that health care was an important issue, the most common response
when asked what specific topics should be discussed within
presidential debates was “lowering the amount people pay for health
care.”54 This observation—that Americans are not necessarily fervent
about expanding coverage, but are intent on controlling cost—may be
a natural response to some of the shortcomings of the ACA. As a
result of this observation, it is worthwhile to examine what the ACA
failed to deliver, and why the arguments in favor of “Medicare-forAll” plans have been met with enthusiasm: it is because the ACA
failed to deliver on cost control goals.

C. Responding to the Shortcomings of the Affordable Care Act
The fact that the Democratic presidential primary spent so much
time on health care policy demonstrates that the ACA did not solve
what ails American health care financing. Indeed, ten years removed
from the messy policy debates of the ACA, platforming “Medicarefor-All” proposals would seem to suggest that President Obama’s
chief domestic achievement may not have sufficiently solved the
American health care cost crisis.
Perhaps the most dogged problem that continues to haunt
American health care under the ACA is its pricing problem. Still, the
ACA individual market has stabilized since its inception and most
average premiums were down or flat in 2019 across the United
States.55 This was a huge turnaround from the early years of the
54

See Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll – June 2019: Health Care in the Democratic
Primary and Medicare-for-All, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 18, 2019), https://www.kff.org
/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-june-2019/ (noting that 28 percent
focused on lowering the cost of care and 18 percent said “increasing access to health care”).

55

See Bob Bryan, Here’s How Much Obamacare Premiums Will Increase in Every State, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 2, 2018, 8:46 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/obamacare-premiumincreases-by-state-trump-effect-2018-11.
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ACA.56 Even though this suggests an optimistic outlook for the cost
of care, major cost control challenges remain.
The high-cost problems are most acute for those who purchase
health insurance on the ACA exchanges but who do not receive
premium assistance tax credits to help defray the costs of health care
premiums.57 These individuals have sought to avoid pay increases so
as to continue to hold on to key subsidies that make their exchangepurchased insurance affordable.58 But it is not just the population of
people who do not get tax subsidies under the ACA that is suffering.
Those who receive insurance through their employer, about 50
percent of total Americans,59 have experienced cost increases.
According to Kaiser, the average American family of four paid
nearly $8,000 on health care in 2018.60 This included premiums of
about $4,700, and cost-sharing that exceeded $3,000.61 This was up 67
percent over ten years before.62 At the same time, the average
employer spent more than $15,000 to insure a family of four, which
was up 51 percent from 2008.63 On all three metrics—out of pocket
spending, premium contributions from employees, and premium
56

See id. (showing premium increases from 2014-19 as high as 200 percent in multiple states).

57

For extensive coverage of this population and how it has fared under the ACA, see Isaac D.
Buck, Affording Obamacare, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 261 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3364502.

58

Id.

59

See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortMo
del=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort% 22:%22asc%22%7D.

60

Darla Mercado, Here’s Why Your Workplace Health Insurance Is So Expensive, CNBC (Aug. 19,
2019, 3:27 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/19/heres-why-your-workplace-healthinsurance-is-so-expensive.html; see Matthew Rae et al., Tracking the Rise in Premium
Contributions and Cost-Sharing for Families with Large Employer Coverage, PETERSON-KAISER
HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org
/brief/tracking-the-rise-in-premium-contributions-and-cost-sharing-for-families-withlarge-employer-coverage/?utm_campaign=KFF-2019-HealthCosts&amp;utm_medium
=email&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_72_RHB9Twe8BpbqOg28rdlGqxq_SBgV6rBkbC4PuYMItIOSxHQLmh_D3OH4GOnUKZXa8&amp;utm_source=hs_email&amp;hsCta
Tracking=04848753-3235-436e-a0de-ae8238ad00ad%7Cc1097ae0-0521-4e9a-8e45e5a87f67af4a.

61

See Mercado, supra note 60.

62

See id.

63

See id.
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contributions from employers—the cost of health care has
substantially increased – from totaling about $10,000 annually in
2003, to well over $22,000 annually in 2018.64
According to another Kaiser study, deductibles are up 162
percent in employer-based insurance since 2009, which drastically
outstrips worker wage growth of 26 percent which occurred during
the same period.65 Now, nearly 30 percent of all workers are enrolled
in a health insurance plan that has an annual deductible of more than
$2,000 for single coverage.66 In 2009, only seven percent of those in
employer-based insurance single coverage plans had annual
deductibles over $2,000.67
These trends are nothing new. The United States outspends
every other country on earth on health care, accounting for more than
$10,000 annually per capita, which is about double the average of
peer countries worldwide.68 The United States’ expenditure on
health care as a percentage of GDP has reached 18 percent.69 America
spent $3.65 trillion on health care in 2018, with private insurance
spending rising 4.5 percent, and prescription drug spending up 3.3
percent.70 Unfortunately, price growth is likely to increase over the
next eight years.71 Spending growth in Medicare over the next eight
years is likely to approach 7.5 percent, largely because of an
enrollment boom.72

64
65

See id.
See Employer Health Benefits Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept.
https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2019-summary-of-findings/.

66

See id.

67

See id.

68

69

25,

2019),

See Bradley Sawyer & Cynthia Cox, How Does Health Spending in the U.S. Compare to Other
Countries?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.
healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/health-spending-u-s-compare-countries/#itemaverage-wealthy-countries-spend-half-much-per-person-health-u-s-spends.
Id.

70

See Erik Sherman, U.S. Health Care Costs Skyrocketed to $3.65 Trillion in 2018, FORTUNE (Feb.
21, 2019, 8:16 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/02/21/us-health-care-costs-2/.

71

See Andrea M. Sisko, National Health Expenditure Projections, 2018–27: Economic and
Demographic Trends Drive Spending and Enrollment Growth, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 491, 495 (2019).

72

Id.at 493.
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All of this data suggests that Americans are unhappy with health
care expenditures and expenditures will likely increase even more in
the years to come. This is a separate issue than just coverage, which
has expanded under the ACA. But, now, it is the American insured
population that faces increased costs every year, which could go a
long way in explaining why “Medicare-for-All” proposals have
become politically popular. If the ACA gave them insurance,
Americans now want affordable insurance.

III. “MEDICARE-FOR-ALL” AS A REGULATORY TROJAN HORSE
Even though it is Medicare that is the access-guaranteeing
program with broad political popularity, it is the rules and
regulations that govern the Medicare program—and their universal
applicability—that would lead to major changes in American health
care finance and delivery. This is because Medicare has been used as
a programmatic platform for many recent regulatory changes and
pilots.73 Specifically, “Medicare-for-All” would expand Medicare’s
potent
regulatory
apparatuses
of
efficiency,
oversight,
standardization, and leverage to the broader health care industry.

A. Standardization
Beyond securing coverage for a vulnerable population, the Medicare
program has pushed American health care progress forward by its data
collection efforts.74 Medicare’s various programs, both permanent
73

See, e.g., Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept.
14, 2015), https://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/; See also
Innovation Models, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov
/initiatives/#views=models (last visited Oct. 2, 2019) (noting that the “Innovation Center
develops new payment and service delivery models in accordance with the … Social
Security Act”).

74

See Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, In Focus: Medicare Data Helps Fill in Picture of Health
Care Performance, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.commonwealth
fund.org/publications/newsletter-article/focus-medicare-data-helps-fill-picture-healthcare-performance (New requirements under the Affordable Care Act have made big
changes in this area. Specifically, the Medicare Data Sharing for Performance Measurement
Program will eventually allow policymakers to link policy goals to what is reflected in the
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policies75 and pilot proposals,76 have driven medical standardization
forward and constitute an important platform from which to learn about
the heterogeneity of medical practice throughout the United States.77
Besides providing a source of information for health policy design,
Medicare also plays an important standard-setting and innovationincentivizing role.78 As an example, the ACA created the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) “to research optimal quality
standards and payment regimes.”79 Although the White House has
sought to substantially cut funding for CMMI, it has been funded
through fiscal year 2019.80 Medicaid, like Medicare, has also been lauded
for how it encourages experimentation and innovation.81

B. Efficiency: Cost Containment for Physicians
Although it has been somewhat reshaped since the beginning of the
Trump administration,82 the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization
data).
75

See id.

76

Id.; see generally Thomas Bodenheimer et al., Can Money Buy Quality? Physician Response to
Pay for Performance, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 445, 451 (2006).

77

Bodenheimer et al., supra note 76 (“Should Medicare adopt P4P, private plans and
Medicaid programs could well decide to adopt Medicare’s measures, which in turn would
reduce the problem of lack of standardization.”).

78

See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Rethinking Medical Liability: A Challenge for Defense Layers, Trial
Lawyers, Medical Providers, and Legislators: An Introduction to the Symposium, 37 U. MEM. L.
REV. 455, 458 (2007) (noting that Medicare has a “central role in setting standards for the
health care system” and “experience in sponsoring demonstrations of health policy
innovations”).

79

Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 47 (2011).

80

See White House Proposes Rescinding Certain CHIP, CMMI Funding, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (May 9,
2018, 8:03 PM), https://www.aha.org/news/headline/2018-05-09-white-house-proposesrescinding-certain-chip-cmmi-funding.

81

See generally Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance,
57 B.C. L. REV. 1, 57 (2016).

82

See Joanne Finnegan, A Break For Doctors: Trump Administration Wants to Reduce Reporting
Burden Under MIPS, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (Feb. 22, 2018, 11:51 AM), https://www
.fiercehealthcare.com/practices/trump-budget-mips-quality-reporting-macra (noting the
proposal from the Trump administration that would eliminate two of the four performance
metrics, and easing or eliminating reporting burdens for physicians under Part B).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3772071

6_BUCK POST MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

176

12/10/20 1:01 PM

HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y

Act of 2015 (MACRA) has made changes to the way Medicare pays
physicians who participate in the program.83 According to CMS, in
addition to ending the sustainable growth rate (SGR) formula,84 MACRA
builds in value-based reimbursement tools, “streamlines multiple quality
programs,” and awards providers who participate in alternative
payment models (APMs) like accountable care organizations.85
Most relevant for the instant analysis, within MACRA, Congress
established the quality payment program, which comprises the MeritBased Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Advanced Alternative
Payment Models (APMs). MIPS provides for “performance-based
payment adjustment” for participating providers, and participation in an
Advanced APM makes the provider eligible for additional incentive
payments.86
Providers who are reimbursed in Medicare Part B and who are not
enrolled in an Advanced APM are required to participate in the MIPS
program.87 The participating physicians’ reimbursements are impacted
by four performance areas: quality, promoting interoperability (which
used to be referred to as “advancing care information”), improvement
activities, and cost.88 The so-called performance years— year in which
providers must heed the new data collection requirements—precede
“payment” years by two years.89

83

See What’s MACRA, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (June 14, 2019),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments
/Value-Based-Programs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs.html.

84

See generally, Isaac D. Buck, Breaking the Fever:
A New Construct for Regulating
Overtreatment, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1304–05 (2015) (“The SGR, however, has never
gotten off the ground. Feeling little individual responsibility, physicians have not changed
their behavior to avoid the ‘punishment’ of declining rates.”).

85

See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., What’s MACRA, supra note 83.

86

See What Is the Quality Payment Program?, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 8,
2019), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Payment-Program/Quality-PaymentProg
ram.html.

87

See MIPS Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://qpp.cms.gov
/mips/overview (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).

88

Id.

89

Id.
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For example, the physician’s performance data collected in 2017
impacted payments made under Medicare Part B for 2019.90 Some Part B
physicians are exempt from the requirements of the MIPS program if
they qualify for low-volume exceptions, based on the total monetary
value billed to the Medicare program, the total number of Part B patients
they have treated, and the number of services they have provided to Part
B beneficiaries.91
MIPS measures the four aforementioned metrics and then compares
providers against one another, using the scores on those metrics to either
increase or decrease their reimbursement under Medicare Part B. For
performance year 2020 (payment year 2022), the maximum penalty and
bonus under the MIPS program is 9 percent.92 Interestingly, MIPS’s
bonuses and penalties are required to be budget-neutral,
meaning the estimated increase in aggregate allowed charges
resulting from the application of positive MIPS payment adjustment
factors must equal the estimated decrease in aggregate allowed
charges resulting from the application of negative MIPS payment
adjustment factors for the MIPS payment year.93
But MIPS’s impact may be blunted. The Medicare Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) has voted to eliminate the program.94 The first
changes, previewed in a CMS proposal rule that has since taken effect,
limited the application of the MIPS program’s applicability to only 36
percent of clinicians.95 Nonetheless, the total number of providers
participating in the first year of MIPS was impressive.96
90

Id.

91

How MIPS Eligibility Is Determined, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://qpp.cms.gov/mips/how-eligibility-is-determined#lowVolumeThreshold-2019 (last
visited Mar. 14, 2020).

92

AM. UROLOGICAL ASS’N, 2020 Physician Fee Schedule Final Rule Top 10 MIPS Takeaways,
https://www.auanet.org/practice-resources/patient-safety-and-quality-of-care/2020mips-toolkit (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).

93

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET: 2019 MERIT-BASED INCENTIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEM (MIPS) PAYMENT ADJUSTMENTS BASED ON 2017 MIPS SCORES 9 (2019),
https://qpp-cm-prod-content.s3.amazonaws.com /uploads/70/2019%20MIPS%20Paymen
t%20Adjustment%20Fact%20Sheet_2018%2011%2029.pdf.

94

Ropes & Gray LLP, See Health Care Provisions in Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, LEXOLOGY
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9a5a75b0-d226-4ff28a42-21bd67eae005.

95

See Jeff Byers, Nine Major Takeaways from the 2018 MACRA Proposed Rule, HEALTHCARE DIVE
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The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 changed some of the parameters
around MACRA, and more specifically, MIPS.97 Particularly, the 2018 act
gives CMS discretion to add flexibility to the cost criterion, moving it
from 30 percent of the overall performance score to allowing CMS to
determine how much to weigh the cost factor, with guidelines of
between 10 and 30 percent.98 Other changes included removing Part B
drug reimbursement from the MIPS calculation, delaying the
implementation of the “performance threshold” (which is the number
“providers must exceed in order to avoid payment reductions”), and
reducing the base physician fee schedule update, which could impact
MACRA’s likelihood of awarding fee increases.99
Whatever the future of the MIPS program and the MACRA law,
expanding the reach of MIPS and MACRA to cover all those providers
who would participate in a “Medicare-for-All” program would have
major impacts on the financing of health care in the United States.
Because of MIPS’s statutorily required budget neutrality100 and its
mandatory nature, providers participating in “Medicare-for-All” could
face mandates that would force them to take account of the four
performance categories. Allowing application of the law to beneficiaries
beyond the strictures of the current Medicare program, and opening it
up to a percentage of the 156 million who have employer-based
insurance, would build a reimbursement mechanism that would reward
all providers101 based on efficiency and quality.
(June 26, 2017), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/macra-qpp-2018-proposedrule/445648/ (“Only 36% of clinicians will be eligible for MIPS after all exclusions, but they
make up 58% of Medicare Part B charges”); See also Ropes & Gray, supra note 94 (“the
Trump administration made regulatory changes that reduced the number of clinicians
required to participate in MIPS”).
96

97

See More Than One Million Providers Participated in MIPS’ First Year. Here’s How They Did.,
ADVISORY BD. (Mar. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2019
/03/25/mips (noting that more than one million providers earned a positive payment
adjustment under the MIPS formula, and that nearly 100,000 eligible clinicians participated
in an Advanced APM, which was beyond CMS’s participation benchmarks for the
program).
See Ropes & Gray, supra note 94.

98

Id.

99

Id.

100

See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 93.

101

This would include those who are not exempted from the MIPS program.
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C. Oversight: Fraud and Abuse Statutory Tools
In addition to cost containment efforts that force additional
efficiency in the health care system, there are powerful fraud and abuse
statutes that enable the federal government to return ill-gotten gains and
deter providers and hospitals from seeking payments to which they are
not entitled.102 These tools protect the integrity of government programs
and taxpayers, seek to lower the overall costs of health care, and ensure
that the programs are administering quality care.103
The most powerful of these statutory tools include the federal civil
False Claims Act (FCA),104 the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS),105 and the
Stark Law.106 These laws provide an extensive regulatory structure that
punishes and prevents hospitals and providers from overbilling,
upcoding, and administering care that is of questionable medical
necessity. Because of their broad reach, these laws represent substantial
deterrent value and help dissuade providers from testing the limits of
their application.
Because Medicare is a taxpayer-funded federal program, application
of the federal statutes to the Medicare program has been natural. But, if
a “Medicare-for-All” program were constructed and successfully
implemented, all three statutes—the FCA, AKS, and Stark Law
application in health care—would extend well beyond the nearly 60
million Americans who make up the total population of Medicare and
Medicare Advantage beneficiaries.107 Assuming that a substantial
102

103

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE: PREVENT, DETECT,
REPORT 4 (2019), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-LearningNetwork-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads /Fraud-Abuse-MLN4649244.pdf (“Although no
precise measure of health care fraud exists, those who exploit Federal health care programs
can cost taxpayers billions of dollars while putting beneficiaries’ health and welfare at
risk.”).
Id. at 17.

104

See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2014).

105

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a–7b (2010).

106

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2010).

107

Total Number of Medicare Beneficiaries, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/medicare
/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel
=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location %22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).
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portion of the largest group of beneficiaries—those who receive health
insurance through their employment—would sign up for ‘Medicare-forAll” plans (or be forced into them), application of the federal health care
statutes and their powerful penalties would be extended over millions of
more individuals.
While the AKS applies to Medicare, Medicaid, and other “federal
health care program business,”108 and the FCA applies to any fraud on
the government,109 the Stark Law only applies to the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.110 Expanding Medicare would not only extend Stark
Law application to all of those who switch from the employer-based
insurance marketplace to “Medicare-for-All” (assuming some version of
employer-based insurance could survive), but it would also apply to all
of those who currently receive their insurance through the ACA’s
exchanges and elect to switch to a “Medicare-for-All” plan. That
population totals about 10 million people, and adding in those who
receive health insurance from “off-exchange plans” would bolster the
total to about 14 million Americans.111
But the much larger pool of individuals—those whose shift to
“Medicare-for-All” would extend regulatory coverage in a much more
robust way—would be the group of Americans who currently receive
health insurance through their employment and would opt, or be forced,
to sign-up for a “Medicare-for-All” plan. According to Kaiser, the
number of Americans with employer-sponsored health insurance totals

108

See Alexander Dworkowiz et al., Extending VBP Models Into Medicaid Drug Purchasing:
Challenges and Opportunities, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (May 22, 2019), https://www.
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190520.247063/full/ (“the AKS is a criminal law that
prohibits the payment of anything of value in exchange for referrals under Medicare,
Medicaid and other federal programs”).

109

See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 381, 381–82
(2001) (the FCA is “the government’s primary litigative tool for combating fraud against the
federal government”).

110

See A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud and Abuse Laws, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp
(last accessed Oct. 4, 2019) (noting that Stark applies to Medicare and Medicaid).

111

See Rachel Fehr et al., Data Note: Changes in Enrollment in the Individual Health Insurance
Market Through Early 2019, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org
/private-insurance/issue-brief/data-note-changes-in-enrollment-in-the-individual-healthinsurance-market-through-early-2019/ (showing that individual enrollment has dropped
from more than 17 million in 2015 to under 14 million in 2018).
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about 156 million people, which makes up about 58 percent of the nonelderly population.112 Interestingly, the shift away from employer-based
insurance seems to have already begun, as that number is down from
67.3 percent of non-elderly Americans who were employer-sponsored
health insurance beneficiaries in 1999.113
Nonetheless, throwing a substantial percentage (or all) of 156
million people into a federally-run “Medicaid-for-All” program would
greatly expand the reach of the federal statutes that are currently moreor-less limited to America’s public health care insurance programs and
have no application to private insurance. At the very least, all three of
the statutes—the FCA, AKS, and Stark Law—would likely have an
impact on the regulation of American health care by simply expanding
applicability of those statutes over a wider swath of American health
care delivery. By expanding the pool of individuals over which these
statutes govern, the statutes themselves become more powerful tools and
have a greater deterrent value. As a result, those providers and jurists
that have lamented the reach and complexity of the Stark law may
represent only the tip of the iceberg in a new “Medicare-for-All”
regime.114
First, and perhaps most importantly because of the size of its
penalties, expanding the application of the False Claims Act (FCA) to the
health care delivery of substantially more Americans would expand its
potency. In fiscal year 2018, resolutions by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) totaled more than $2.8 billion, including settlements and
judgments.115 Of the $2.8 billion recovered, $2.5 billion related to the
health care industry, with 2018 marking “the ninth consecutive year that

112

Id.

113

Id. (“The share has declined markedly over the last two decades, with the greatest
percentage reductions among people with incomes under 400 percent of poverty ($85,320
for a family of three in 2019).”).

114

See United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey Healthcare Sys., 792 F.3d 364, 395 (4th Cir.
2015) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“This case is troubling. It seems as if, even for well-intentioned
health care providers, the Stark Law has become a booby trap rigged with strict liability and
potentially ruinous exposure—especially when coupled with the False Claims Act.”).

115

See Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year
2018, DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. PUB. AFFS. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018
[hereinafter DOJ Recovers Over $2.8 Billion in 2018].
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the Department’s civil health care fraud settlements and judgments have
exceeded $2 billion.”116
Most of these recoveries went back into federal coffers, but Medicaid
programs have been bolstered by DOJ’s FCA recoveries as well.117 Since
1986, the government has recovered more than $59 billion in civil FCA
case resolutions.118 Extending FCA application over millions more of
Americans—and particularly because of its exorbitant penalties119—
would likely achieve important regulatory results.120
Second, application of federal criminal statutes, such as the AKS,
would also be extended to the same population. The AKS is an intentbased statute that currently applies to federal health care program
beneficiaries, but can also be used to deter inappropriate business
relationships from taking root within health care delivery for those
currently outside of the ambit of the federal health care programs.121
While other criminal statutes do govern health care fraud and abuse that
occurs in the private insurance industry,122 extension of the broad reach
of the AKS would likely have a notable influence on American health
care delivery.123
116

Id.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

See Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act to Target Overtreatment,
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463, 495, 505–10 (2013) [hereinafter Buck, Caring Too Much].

120

Interestingly, extending application of the FCA and other federal health care fraud statutes
over the health care delivery of millions more Americans would also likely require the
hiring of additional health care fraud prosecutors, which would likely lead to more
recoveries. As has been noted, between 2009 and 2011, the government recovered $7.20 for
every dollar spent on health care fraud prevention and prosecution. See Kelly Kennedy,
Fight Against Health Care Fraud Recovers $4.1B, USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2012, 8:48 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-14/sebelius-holderannounce-health-care-fraud-money/53097474/1.

121

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b (2010).

122

See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2010). See also Jeffrey S. Baird & Erica L. Beacom, Defrauding
Commercial Insurers: Criminal Liability, MEDTRADE (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.medtrade
.com/news/billing-reimbursement/defrauding-commercial-insurers-criminal-liability/
(“Contrary to common belief, arrangements within the private, third party payor sphere are
not immune from federal government scrutiny or enforcement.”).

123

See DOJ Recovers Over $2.8 Billion in 2018, supra note 116 (“. . .the Department continued to
place great importance on enforcing the safeguards contained within the Anti-Kickback
Statute (AKS).”).
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Finally, application of the Stark Law would also have an impact. The
Stark Law prevents physicians who participate in the Medicare program
from self-referring Medicare patients for designated health services
without falling under a regulatory exception.124 Stark applies—most
directly—to “eliminate any financial motivation for physicians to send
patients for unnecessary testing that could raise overall health care
costs.”125 Stark has likely influenced health care entities’ decisions to link
a physician’s pay to their efficiency and services provided.126 Hospitals
have been found liable under the Stark Law due to bonus structures that
are based on productivity and profit.127 An expansion of Stark
application would impose additional strictures around self-referrals in
American health care that currently are not universally applicable.

D. Softer Power: Leverage
In addition to the three well-known statutes mentioned above, the
Medicare program also uses its size and other penalties to exert leverage
on providers. Through (1) its administrative penalty known as
exclusion,128 and (2) its simple market share, Medicare is able to force
providers and entities into making changes to health care delivery
through softer administrative power and economic leverage. Through
the power of exclusion and greater control on prices, Medicare can exert
this softer leverage on the providers and entities that participate in the
program.

124

See Physician Self-Referral, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 5, 2015, 10:59 AM),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/.

125

Ayla Ellison, 15 Things to Know about Stark Law, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Feb. 18, 2017),
https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-regulatory-issues/15-things-to-knowabout-stark-law-021717.html.

126
127

128

See id.
Tuomey Healthcare System was found liable in 2015 for violating the Stark Law, and was
assessed a $237 million penalty. The Tuomey contracts were paying doctors “a base salary
based on the prior years’ production, with substantial productivity bonuses equal to nearly
80% of aggregate compensation”. See Scott Becker & Holly Carnell, The Tuomey Case: 12 Key
Points, BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (July 16, 2015), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legalregulatory-issues/the-tuomey-case-12-key-points.html [hereinafter Becker, Tuomey Case: 12
Points].
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7 (2010).
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Exclusion. Because the ability to participate in the Medicare
program is so important to hospitals and providers, the exclusion
penalty has been referred to as the “death penalty.”129 Exclusion is
particularly potent, given the percentage of expenditures that Medicare
provides in the United States.130 Because of this leverage and providers’
fears of exclusion, Medicare exclusion has become a potent tool available
to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to bring about
policy change.131 The power of exclusion is a unique remedy available to
the Medicare program, in that it demonstrates the leverage that the
program has over the participating providers and entities. An
implemented “Medicare-for-All” proposal would supercharge the power
of this exclusionary penalty, as excluded providers would be unable to
administer health care to any patients, not just a Medicare subset.
Controlling Prices. Shifting millions of Americans to a single-payer
system could save the health care system a substantial amount. A 2019
study concluded that generally, the public payers of Medicare and
Medicaid “have done a better job at controlling spending than private
payers have.”132 Specifically, from 2006 to 2017, spending per enrollee

129

See Robert Pear, Trump Administration Invites Health Care Industry to Help Rewrite Ban on
Kickbacks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/24/us/politics
/trump-health-care-kickbacks-medicare-medicaid.html (“A health care provider who
violates the anti-kickback or self-referral law may face business-crippling fines under the
False Claims Act and can be excluded from Medicare and Medicaid, a penalty tantamount
to a professional death sentence for some providers.”); see also Rodney A. Smolla, Off-Label
Drug Advertising and the First Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81 (2015) (“The impact of
exclusion from federal reimbursement for programs such as a Medicare and Medicaid is
catastrophic for many entities—a health care reimbursement death penalty.”); see also Buck,
Caring Too Much, supra note 119 at 506–07.

130

See Juliette Cubanski et al., The Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/the-facts-on-medicarespending-and-financing/ (“Medicare spending was 15 percent of total spending in 2018,
and is projected to rise to 18 percent by 2029.”). See also Christian D. Humphreys, Regulation
of Physician Self-Referral Arrangements: Is Prohibition the Answer Or Has Congress Operated on
the Wrong Patient, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 161, 165 (1993) (noting that Medicare spending was
as high as 40 percent of overall health care expenditures in the early 1990s.).

131

See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., List of Excluded Individuals
and Entities, https://oig.hhs.gov/exclusions/exclusions_list.asp (last updated Sept. 6, 2019)
(providing downloadable databases of excluded providers and entities).

132

Shelby Livingston, Medicare, Medicaid Contains Costs Better Than Private Insurers, Study Says,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 11, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com
/article/20190211/NEWS/190219996/medicare-medicaid-contain-costs-better-than-
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grew 2.4 percent in the Medicare program, 1.6 percent in the Medicaid
program, and 4.4 percent for private insurance.133 Specifically, according
to the study’s authors, “[t]he larger cost containment problems the
nation faces are in the private insurance market.”134 Nonetheless, CMS
has noted that Medicare is likely to experience annual spending growth
that exceeds private insurance.135
Although up for debate, Medicare may pay less overhead than
private insurance. Medicare’s administrative costs have been found
to amount to less than two percent of the program’s total costs.136 In
2017, Medicare’s administrative costs accounted for only 1.1 percent
of total spending.137 When one includes Medicare’s private plans—
the Part D drug benefit plans and Part C Medicare Advantage—the
total percentage of administrative overhead jumps to 7 percent.138
Indeed, Medicare’s Part D private drug plans have administrative
costs that total about 11 percent.139

private-insurers-study-says.
133

See id.

134

J. HOLAHAN & S. MCMORROW, SLOW GROWTH IN MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SPENDING PER
ENROLLEE HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DEBATES, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2019),
https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2019/02/slow-growth-in-medicare-andmedicaid-spending-per-enrollee.html (last accessed Oct. 1, 2019).

135

National Health Expenditure Projections 2018-2027, Forecast Summary, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/ForecastSummary.pdf.
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/ForecastSummary.pdf (last accessed Jan.
19, 2020).

136

Potetz et al., A Primer on Medicare Financing, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 2011),
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/a-primer-on-medicare-financing/; see also
Steffie Woolhandler & David Himmelstein, Single-Payer Reform: The Only Way to Fulfill the
President’s Pledge of More Coverage, Better Benefits, and Lower Costs, ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
(Apr. 18, 2017) (Original version published Feb. 21, 2017), https://annals.org/
aim/fullarticle/2605414 (noting that the administrative overhead for “traditional Medicare”
was 2.2 percent).

137

See Austin Frakt, Is Medicare for All the Answer to Sky-High Administrative Costs?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/upshot/is-medicare-for-all-theanswer-to-sky-high-administrative-costs.html.

138
139

Id.
Id. (“All of this additional, private administrative cost is paid for by taxpayers and, through
their premiums, people who use Medicare.”).
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This is compared to private insurers’ administrative costs, which
have been estimated between 12140 and 17 percent of revenues.141 It
has been estimated that “the government’s administrative costs are
about $132 per person on Medicare, compared with over $700 for
private plans.”142 If accurate, this means that administrative costs for
private plans constitute more than five times the administrative costs
associated with Medicare.143 Eliminating these administrative costs
from the health care landscape would save the system money.
Nonetheless, some of this larger budget may be due to care
management or network management, which could improve quality
outcomes, and would, in the long run, add efficiencies into the health
care delivery system.144
These include “nurse hotlines, case
managers, network management and maintenance, customer service
operations, and federal, state, and local taxes and fees.”145 Indeed,
citing and crediting the percentage of administrative costs as a
measure of efficiency has become contentious, with others
concluding that one should examine administrative costs per
beneficiary in real dollar amounts.146 Under this analysis, Medicare
has a higher administrative cost, at $509 per beneficiary, versus
private insurance’s number, at $453.147
Whether or not administrative costs are saved by adopting a
“Medicare-for-All” proposal, a RAND study released in the spring of

140

See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 136 (noting that “private insurers’ overhead
currently averages 12.4 percent”).

141

See Diane Archer, Medicare Is More Efficient Than Private Insurance, HEALTH AFFS. (Sept. 20,
2011), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20110920.013390/full/.

142

Frakt, supra note 137.

143

See id.

144

See id.

145

Glenn Kessler, Medicare, Private Insurance and Administrative Costs: A Democratic Talking
Point, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2017/09/19/medicare-private-insurance-and-administrative-costs-ademocratic-talking-point/.

146

See Robert Book, Medicare-For-All Would Increase, Not Save, Administrative Costs, FORBES: THE
APOTHECARY (Sept. 20, 2017, 5:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary
/2017/09/20/medicare-for-all-would-increase-not-save-administrativecosts/#783c63960ba5.

147

See id.; see also Kessler, supra note 145.
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2019 demonstrates a major discrepancy in the hospital rates paid by
Medicare and the rates paid by private insurance.148 The study
concluded that private insurance paid hospitals 241 percent of
Medicare rates.149 Further, private-insurance-paid outpatient services
were nearly three times higher than what the Medicare rates were
(293 percent total), and inpatient services were paid at 204 percent of
Medicare rates.150
The study examined nearly 1,600 hospitals and looked at claims
for four million people.151 The researchers suggested a move away
from discounted pricing and toward a fixed-price reimbursement
structure like the one seen in the Medicare program.152 Transparency
is not likely to address the crisis, but “employers may need state or
federal policy interventions to rebalance negotiating leverage
between hospitals and employer health plans.”153 According to
RAND’s press release, “[i]f employers and health plans participating
in the study had paid hospitals using Medicare’s payment formulas,
total payments over the 2015-2017 period would have been reduced
by $7 billion—a decline of more than 50 percent.”154

148

149

See Morgan Haefner, Private Insurers Pay Hospitals 2.4 Times What Medicare Pays, BECKER’S
HOSP. REV. (May 9, 2019), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/payer-issues/
hospitals-get-241-more-from-private-payers-than-medicare-rand-says.html.
See id.

150

See CHAPIN WHITE & CHRISTOPHER WHALEY, PRICES PAID TO HOSPITALS BY PRIVATE HEALTH
PLANS ARE HIGH RELATIVE TO MEDICARE AND VARY WIDELY 19 (2019), https://www.rand
.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3033.html.https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR3033.html.

151

See Private Health Plans Pay Hospitals 241% of What Medicare Would Pay, RAND (May 9,
2019), https://www.rand.org/news/press/2019/05/09.html.

152

See id.

153

White & Whaley, supra note 150 at ix.

154

RAND, Private Health Plans Pay Hospitals 241% of What Medicare Would, supra note 151; see
also Shefali Luthra, Market Muscle: Study Uncovers Differences Between Medicare and Private
Insurers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 9, 2019), https://khn.org/news/market-muscle-studyuncovers-differences-between-medicare-and-private-insurers/ (noting that health spending
would have been reduced by $7.7 billion if private payers would have paid the same rates
as Medicare’s rates).
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E. The ERISA Run-Around
In addition to the substantive regulatory fixes that can be achieved
through “Medicare-for-All” programs, procedural successes that focus
on avoiding regulatory hurdles may follow. For example, state efforts to
bring about health care reform have been particularly stymied by a legal
barrier, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).155
Through its preemption rules, ERISA provides broad, prophylactic
limitations on states’ abilities to pass laws that “relate to” health benefit
plans.156 A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision has made clear that
states have limited ability to pass laws that relate to self-funded
employer-based insurance plans, severely limiting states’ abilities to
contemplate health reform efforts, including establishing a single-payer
program.157 Because ERISA’s preemption rules lock out states from
regulating in this space, an expansion of the federally-run and organized
Medicare program would avoid the reach of ERISA preemption. Such
an expansion would also avoid at least one other legal block on states’
efforts to regulate in this space.158

IV. OPEN QUESTIONS AND CHALLENGES
While the positive regulatory impacts, at least from a cost control
perspective, seem seductive, there remain open questions and challenges
related to the push for “Medicare-for-All.” Beyond the challenge of the
cost of the program to the federal coffers,159 additional challenges range

155
156

157

See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2014).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006); see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016)
(holding that a data reporting requirement established under state law—in an effort to
consider the feasibility of a single payer delivery system—was preempted and void under
ERISA preemption rules).
See Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936.

158

See Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding Maryland’s
anti-gouging prescription drug pricing law unconstitutional under the dormant commerce
clause).

159

See Ronald Brownstein, The Eye-Popping Cost of Medicare For All, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/high-cost-warren-and-sandersssingle-payer-plan/600166/ (observing the Urban Institute’s projection that a Medicare for
All plan would cost “$34 trillion in additional federal spending over its first decade in
operation”).
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from (1) dislocation, to (2) scaling and predictability concerns, to (3)
spillover effects and pushback from incumbents. All three of these
impacts are explored below.
Dislocation. First, there is the chief concern that the current benefits
that inure to the Medicare program are not universally transferable. For
instance, should “Medicare-for-All” be implemented, the crosssubsidization that occurs from private insurance (assuming the
“Medicare-for-All” plan that is adopted requires a mandatory element)
would disappear. In other words, what makes Medicare so efficient now
is that providers continue to participate in the Medicare program and do
not have to clamor for increasing reimbursement because they receive
such substantial reimbursements from private insurance. Eliminating
private insurance would eliminate this cross-subsidy. This would likely
cause tension within the reimbursement structure for “Medicare-forAll,” as providers would push for increased reimbursement within the
program to make up for the loss in revenue due to the evaporation of the
private market.
As a result, an important caveat must be made. Because Medicare
represents a percentage of overall payer mixes for most providers, it has
been able to achieve certain efficiencies and standardizations. This, in
turn, creates the real possibility that many of the positive impacts of the
Medicare reimbursement-related rules are not guaranteed, and may be
blunted due to the elimination of cross-subsidization from private
payers.
Scaling and Predictability. Second, this analysis contemplates that the
regulatory regime that currently governs the Medicare program would
largely be retained when expanded. But, extending the Medicare
program to the entire United States population could pose challenges for
scaling that are difficult to identify and quantify at this stage. Put
simply, expanding enrollment by more than 100 million people presents
uncertainty. Indeed, perhaps it is the fractured nature of Medicare (it
only covers a defined population) that allows it to retain a stricter
regulatory environment. For instance, Stark Law regulations could
change, and become less strenuous, in a world of “Medicare-for-All.” In
short, it is difficult to determine the full impact a proposed universal
Medicare program would have on its regulatory regime.
Spillover Effects and Incumbent Pushback. Lastly, throughout the
history of the Medicare program, dominant hospitals and providers have
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been able to stymie changes that are not advantageous to their powerful
constituents. These actions, mainly accomplished through political
action and changing business models, allow dominant hospitals and
providers to prevent or blunt regulatory changes that they wish to reject.
This is an important caveat to mention as policymakers contemplate
regulatory changes that could follow the construction of a “Medicare-forAll” regime because reactions by American hospitals and providers
could be hard to predict. Overall, the extent of pushback and the
spillover impacts of “Medicare-for-All” are likewise difficult to predict.

V. CONCLUSION
The political rhetoric surrounding “Medicare-for-All” has
outstripped its policy specifics. Many of the proposed plans using
the Medicare platform have very little to do with the venerable
universal program that has served America’s elderly for more than a
half-century. Instead, it appears that the appetite for a universal
insurance guarantee is more about the failure of the ACA to achieve
cost control than it is to guarantee universal insurance to all
American citizens.
Nonetheless, and whether ill-fitting or not, “Medicare-for-All”
plans would impact American health financing by extending vast
regulatory resources and rules over the entirety of American health
care delivery. These regulations would apply different efficiency,
standardization, leverage, and oversight standards to American
health care writ large. Also, they would steer clear of the legal
hurdles, most namely ERISA, that states have encountered as they
have attempted to achieve health care reform in the post-ACA era.
Ultimately, whether or not the proposals are politically palatable to
the American populace is an open question. Nonetheless, their rise
into the public consciousness indicates something valuable for future
discussions of American health law and policy during the Trump era.
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